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Intractable Consent:  A Legislative 
Solution to the Problem of the Aging 
Consent Decrees in United States v. 
ASCAP and United States v. BMI 
733 
Noel L. Hillman* 
INTRODUCTION 
The intersection of intellectual property and antitrust presents 
one of the great ironies in the law.  Antitrust law presumes that the 
advantages of monopoly are outweighed by the dangers inherent in 
concentrations of market power.  Yet the law of intellectual prop-
erty, especially copyright law, seems to presume the opposite.  A 
monopoly is good—even one extended and protected by statute for 
many decades, as is copyright.  In those cases where this natural 
tension between seemingly opposite forces ceases to exist, the 
danger of monopolistic malfeasance increases.  Where these forces 
coalesce, as when a copyright owner also accomplishes unfettered 
market power, the results can be disastrous for consumers of prod-
ucts subject to intellectual property rights. 
During those years when the federal government vigorously 
enforces the antitrust laws, consent decrees are entered into which 
attempt to delineate proper conduct into the future.  However, such 
decrees may fail to anticipate how changes in technology and con-
sumer habits alter market mechanisms and the effect the consent 
decree itself will have on how market actors behave.1  Those de-
 
* Assistant U.S. Attorney, Fraud and Public Protection Division, District of New 
Jersey.  Monmouth College, B.A., cum laude, 1981; Seton Hall University School of 
Law, J.D., cum laude, 1985; New York University School of Law, LL.M. 1998.  The au-
thor thanks Professor Harry First of New York University School of Law and John F. 
Peoples, Esq. of Pennsylvania for their patience, encouragement, and counsel.  All ex-
pressions of opinion, belief, and advocacy are the author’s alone and do not necessarily 
reflect the position of any other person or entity. 
1. The idea that those who negotiate a consent decree would fail to recognize the 
decree’s own gravity in computing a fair result is not unlike the scientist who fails to rec-
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crees which lack any meaningful provisions for modification will 
remain in place, self-perpetuating, and undisturbed during those 
periods when the antitrust laws are not vigorously enforced.  At 
best, they become dormant and ineffective.  At worst, the decree 
itself becomes anti-competitive when the market it had sought to 
control in the past no longer exists and the market structure created 
by the consent decree itself favors the former “monopolist” whose 
behavior the consent decree had sought, in the first instance, to 
control. 
The explosive growth of the electronic media, with its con-
comitant increase in demand for public performance of copy-
righted music, is casting doubt on the continued utility of consent 
decrees as a means of regulating anti-competitive behavior by the 
holders of intellectual property rights.  Nowhere is this problem 
more evident than in the example of the consent decrees entered in 
United States v. American Society of Composers Authors and Pub-
lishers2 and United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc.3  Those consent 
decrees purport to control the market for the licensing of the exclu-
sive right of public performance granted by statute to the owners of 
copyrighted musical compositions and exercised through perform-
ance rights societies.4 
This Essay argues that inflexible consent decrees are inherently 
flawed as a tool for resolving antitrust enforcement disputes re-
garding intellectual property.  Part I describes the copyright 
owner’s right of public performance and relates that to the devel-
opment of performing rights societies to enforce that right.  Part II 
recounts the unsuccessful attempts by government and private liti-
 
ognize that his or her mere presence may have an effect on the observed phenomenon.  
See generally W. HEISENBERG, PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE QUANTUM THEORY (1930) 
(revealing the “uncertainty principle”).  One way to minimize the risk is to insure that all 
antitrust consent decrees entered into by the government include an explicit, democratic, 
and workable mechanism to effect changes in the consent decree as market conditions 
change, either as a result of the consent decree itself or other changes. 
2. 1950 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 62,595 (1950).  The 1950 decree superseded a previous 
decree entered in 1941.  See 1941 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 56,104 (1941). 
3. 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,941 (1966). 
4. The two largest performance rights societies are the American Society of Com-
posers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”).  See in-
fra Part I.B (containing a complete discussion of the development and operation of per-
formance rights societies). 
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gants to regulate the performance right for copyrighted music, and 
further recounts anecdotal evidence of the subsequent exercise of 
unchecked market power by the performing rights societies.  Part 
III argues that the demonstrated futility of seeking judicial and ex-
ecutive relief has left legislative action as the only remaining 
means of providing equity in the market for the right to publicly 
perform copyrighted music.  This Essay concludes that Congress 
should provide an alternate mechanism to replace existing consent 
decrees as a means of resolving rate disputes between users of 
copyrighted material and the performing rights societies. 
I. FEDERAL PROTECTION FOR THE RIGHT OF PUBLIC 
PERFORMANCE 
It is often said, and correctly so, that the lasting strength of this 
country’s political and economic institutions can be traced directly 
to the prescience of the Framers of the Constitution.  Nowhere is 
this more evident than the Copyright Clause.5  Long before the ad-
vent of television, compact discs, and motion pictures, the Foun-
ders recognized the economic, intellectual, and social gains to be 
made by granting Congress the power to grant copyrights and pat-
ents.6 
A. The Constitutional Stature of Intellectual Property Rights 
and the Public Performing Right 
The theory behind the copyright clause is simple.  The law 
would create and protect a monopoly, limited in time, in the ex-
ploitation for profit of an author’s work in exchange for a dedica-
tion of the work to the public domain at the end of the monopoly’s 
term.  Few would doubt the contribution our intellectual property 
laws have made to this country’s cultural7 and economic promi-
 
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
6. Id. (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful 
arts by securing for a limited time to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their re-
spective writings and discoveries”).  It does not diminish the foresight of the founding 
fathers to note the English antecedent to the copyright clause, commonly known as the 
Statute of Anne.  8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710). 
7. See, e.g., Judith Beth Prowda, U.S. Dominance in the “Marketplace of Culture” 
and the French “Cultural Exception”, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 193, 193-94 (1997) 
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nence.8 
The holder of a modern copyright is said to have not one right, 
but, rather, a bundle of rights.  With regard to a musical composi-
tion, these rights include the right to make copies of the work,9 to 
make other versions of the work,10 to sell copies and recordings of 
the work,11 and to perform the work in public.12  Consistent with 
the constitutional mandate of the copyright clause, under the fed-
eral copyright act these rights belong, with certain limited excep-
tions, to the copyright holder13 for the statutory term.14 
 
(discussing French objection to the “Americanization” of European television broadcast-
ing). 
8. See Melvin Simensky, The New Role of Intellectual Property in Commercial 
Transactions, N.Y. L.J., May 8, 1992, at 1 (quoting investment banker for the proposition 
that 80% of value of some companies is in trademarks and noting the important “role of 
intellectual property in the global marketplace”). 
9. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994) (“[O]wner of copyright . . . has the exclusive 
right[] . . . to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords.”). 
10. Id. § 106(2) (“[O]wner of copyright . . . has the exclusive right[] . . . to prepare 
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.”). 
11. Id. § 106(3) (“[O]wner of copyright . . . has the exclusive right[] . . . to distribute 
copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of 
ownership.”). 
12. Id. § 106(4) (“[O]wner of copyright . . . has the exclusive right[] . . . in the case 
of . . . musical . . . works . . . to perform the copyrighted work publicly.”).  The owner of 
a copyrighted musical work also enjoys the right to display the copyrighted work pub-
licly.  Id. § 106(5).  To “perform” is broadly defined by the Copyright Act and “means to 
recite, render, play, dance, or act [the work], either directly or by means of any device or 
process . . . .”  Id. § 101.  Congress intended this definition to be all encompassing “in-
cluding all kinds of equipment for reproducing or amplifying sounds or visual images, 
any sort of transmitting apparatus,” and perhaps anticipating the increasing role of com-
puters and digital technology “any type of electronic retrieval system, and any other tech-
niques and systems not yet in use or even invented.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 64 (1976). 
13. Sections 107 through 121 of the Copyright Act contain exceptions to the rights 
granted by section 106.  17 U.S.C. §§ 106-121 (1994).  Consistent with the historical 
view of United States copyright law that elevates the author over the performer, section 
114 applies directly to the public performance right by exempting the public performance 
right from the bundle of rights held by the owner of a copyright in a sound recording.  Id. 
§ 114.  Most of the other exemptions apply in some fashion to musical compositions, and 
generally exempt from the definition of copyright infringement arguably noncommercial 
uses that serve some greater societal good.  Those uses include:  criticism or parody, id. § 
107 (fair use); library use archival activities, id. § 108; the alienability of copies pur-
chased from copyright owner, id. § 109 (the so-called “first sale” doctrine); public per-
formance to further teaching, religious and governmental activities, id. § 110, and in-
creased dissemination, id. § 111(a) (non-commercial secondary transmission).  These 
exemptions have little or no effect on commercial public performances administered by 
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Although Congress first passed a copyright act in 1790,15 a 
statutory right of exclusive public performance for a musical com-
position did not exist until 1897.16  The right of public performance 
for musical compositions continued through this century’s first ma-
jor revision of the copyright act in 1909 and maintained its impor-
tant stature in the second major revision of the copyright law in 
1976. 
B. The Historical Development of the Performing Rights 
Societies 
In the early days of the United States, the public performance 
right meant little more than the right to perform a musical compo-
sition by voice and acoustic instruments.  The number of people 
who could hear—and therefore would be willing to pay to hear—a 
musical composition was delimited by the boundaries of physics 
 
the performing rights societies.  Certain other exemptions have an indirect effect through 
compulsory, statutory, or negotiated fee provisions.  See id. § 111(b) (compulsory license 
for cable system secondary transmissions), id. § 116 (negotiated license or arbitration for 
public performances on jukeboxes), id. § 118 (compulsory license for public broadcasting 
after market failure), and id. § 119 (statutory license for satellite carriers).  The complex-
ity, scope, and necessity of these statutory fee-setting mechanisms are compelling evi-
dence of the inability of the free market to set prices in the market of public perform-
ances, which is clear indicia of monopoly. 
14. The statutory term for a musical work created on or after January 1, 1978 is cur-
rently the life of the author plus fifty years.  Id. § 302.  Congress is currently considering 
extending the statutory term to “life plus 70” in order to conform United States law to the 
current term of protection under the law of the European Union.  On March 25, 1998, the 
House of Representatives passed The Copyright Extension Act, HR 2589, winning praise 
from BMI.  In a press release, issued on the day of the bill’s passage through the House, 
Frances Preston, president and chief executive officer of BMI, stated, “We’re very 
pleased that the House has passed the Copyright Term Extension Act, often called Life 
plus 70.  It will offer American creators and copyright holders the same protection now 
enjoyed by their peers in most developed nations around world.”  See BMI Urges Senate 
to Pass Copyright Term Extension Act Without Harmful Amendment, PR Newswire, Mar. 
25, 1998, available in WESTLAW, 3/25/98 PRWIRE 17:39:00. 
15. Act of May 31, 1790, ch.15, 1 Stat. 124, repealed by Copyright Act of 1802, ch. 
36, 2 Stat. 171. 
16. Copyright Act of 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481.  See generally S. SHEMEL & M. 
KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 133 (6th ed. 1990).  The availability of criminal 
sanctions under the Copyright Act of 1897 underlined the importance attached to this 
right.  Willful infringement, if motivated by profit, was punishable by up to a year in 
prison, a misdemeanor.  Rev. Stat. Section 4966. 
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and existing technology.17  Since that time, the growth of tech-
nologies that facilitate and expand the number of people who can 
experience a public performance have rendered that right one of 
the most important protected by the copyright laws.18  The wide-
spread use of electricity and amplification alone has greatly ex-
panded the audience for music.19  From the success of radio earlier 
this century,20 through the growth of television and cable in recent 
decades,21 we have become increasingly exposed to copyrighted 
music.  Indeed it is difficult to conceive of how someone in mod-
ern society could help but be exposed to public performances vir-
tually every day, no matter where they went or the time of day.  
 
17. Prior to the advent of mass media, the primary source of revenue for the owner 
of a copyright in a musical composition was the sale of sheet music.  See generally Shull, 
Collecting Collectively:  ASCAP’s Perennial Dilemma, 7 ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAW 
SYMPOSIUM 35 (1956). 
18. With regard to popular music the right of public performance may be more im-
portant than any of the other sticks in the bundle of rights.  Many more people have 
heard, enjoyed, and in some way paid for the pleasure of listening to most popular songs 
than actually own an authorized “copy” of it. 
19. See, e.g., Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 197 (1931) (ruling 
that placement of loudspeakers by hotel proprietor in public and private rooms to amplify 
infringing radio broadcast was public performance for profit under 1909 Act); cf. Twenti-
eth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 160 (1975) (limiting Jewell-LaSalle to 
its facts and holding that small restaurant’s use of four speakers and home stereo equip-
ment not a performance under the 1909 Act). 
20. See Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411, 
412 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 556 (1925) (ruling that radio broadcast constituted 
public performance under 1909 Act). 
21. Under the 1909 Act certain acts of retransmission were held not to be public 
performances.  In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., the Supreme Court 
held that the use of a community antenna system to retransmit a broadcast television sig-
nal was not a “performance” under the 1909 Act but merely an enhancement of “the 
viewers capacity to receive the broadcasters signal.”  392 U.S. 390, 399 (1968).  Simi-
larly, the Court held that Fortnightly was controlling precedent even when the retrans-
mission carrier added content and brought in distant signals, the forerunner of modern 
cable systems.  See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 415 U.S. 394 
(1974).  Congress took up the Supreme Court’s challenge in Teleprompter to amend the 
Copyright Act if it disagreed with these decisions by expanding the statutory definition of 
“perform” as part of the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act.  See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 
(1976).  Congress seems not to have been concerned that the broad definition of “per-
formance” might bring about a windfall to the performing rights societies.  Cf. Aiken, 422 
U.S. at 163 (broad definition of perform would allow ASCAP to demand “untold number 
of licenses for what is basically a single public rendition”). 
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When one adds together traditional broadcast sources,22 common-
place technologies,23 the more esoteric and developing delivery 
systems of microwave, satellite, pay per view,24 closed systems in 
commercial and office settings such as Muzak, and the advent of 
the Internet,25 it is difficult to fathom the enormous market for the 
public performance of copyrighted music.26  In 1997 alone, the 
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers 
(“ASCAP”) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”) realized revenues 
of $495 million27 and $428 million,28 respectively.29 
 
22. See Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031, 1036 (D. Mont. 
1990) (playing music on radio “public performance” within the meaning of copyright 
law). 
23. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986) (cus-
tomer of videocassette rental business “publicly performed” work by playing tape on 
player in room rented to the general public). 
24. See On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787, 
789-90 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (ruling hotel room viewing of pay-per-view movie to be public 
performance within the meaning of the Copyright Act). 
25. Unlike a transmission over traditional media, a “broadcaster” over the Internet 
may owe a fee to the owner of the sound recording as well as one to the composer.  See 
Martin Schwimmer & Craig S. Mende, Madonna and Audio Streaming:  Copyright In-
fringement on the Internet, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 9, 1998, at S3. 
26. See Judy A. Kim, The Performer’s Plight in Sound Recordings—Unique to the 
U.S.:  A Comparative Study of the Development of Performers’ Rights in the United 
States, England, and France, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 453, 453 n.4 (1986) (describ-
ing the right as “one of the most important rights secured by the copyright laws”). 
27. Of this figure ASCAP paid out $416 million to its 75,000 members. 
28. Of this figure BMI paid out $355 million to its 20,000 members. 
29. The market value of any particular composition may also be expanded, some-
what inadvertently, by the compulsory licensing system for compositions fixed as sound 
recordings.  Although a composer has the exclusive right to authorize copies of his or her 
work, that right is significantly modified once the composer grants the use of the compo-
sition in a sound recording.  After publication in that medium, the composer is compelled 
by statute to allow the use of the composition in other recordings.  In addition to “com-
pulsory licensing,” the composer loses the ability to set the price for the use of the com-
position.  Instead, the compensation is set by arbitration and historically has resulted in 
royalties which do not favor the composer.  This loss of revenue would seem to be offset, 
however, by increased revenues from the public performance right.  Although the deriva-
tive sound recording and performance are compelled at a low royalty rate, the public per-
formance of the recording of the underlying work must be paid for at the same rate that 
applies to any other public performance.  Where a composition has become a recording 
standard, it may exist in a hundred different versions.  Each public performance of that 
composition, in whatever version, means increased public performance royalties for the 
composer. 
HILLMAN.TYP 9/29/2006  4:41 PM 
740 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 8:733 
1. The Need For Performing Rights Societies:  Why 
Individual Licensing Does Not Work 
By virtue of the statutory right to control the public perform-
ance of a protected work, every time a song is broadcast over any 
medium or played live, the composer is entitled to compensation.30  
If the composer had control over when such performances oc-
curred, there would be little difficulty in collecting the appropriate 
tithe or withholding the work from a public airing in the absence of 
a full and prompt license fee.31  Ironically, however, if the com-
poser exercises his or her other important statutory right to sell 
copies of the work, enforcement of the right to a royalty for public 
performance becomes a logistical impossibility.  A popular song 
might be, and likely is, played simultaneously in a bar in New 
York City, over the radio in Texas, and as a part of a television 
commercial in California.  In the absence of an effective honor sys-
tem, no composer who sold copies of a work could ever be assured 
of a royalty payment for each and every public performance. 
The remedy that developed for what would otherwise be a 
market failure—the inability of the seller of a product to collect 
revenue from a buyer or user—was the “performing rights soci-
ety.”32  Stated simply, the society, for a fee, markets a composer’s 
public performance right.  More specifically, the society serves 
 
30. The exclusive right to control a public performance is infringed even if the in-
fringer gains no direct financial benefit from the performance.  See Herbert v. Shanley 
Co., 242 U.S. 591, 592 (1917) (ruling that a restaurant infringed right of public perform-
ance even though no admission charged separately). 
31. Unlike trademarks, which incur their value from public use, the owner of a 
copyright has no obligation, by statute or common law, to exercise any of the bundle of 
exclusive rights associated with copyrights.  Unlike trademarks which may last indefi-
nitely—assuming public use—copyrights extend only for a limited time at the end of 
which period the work enters the public domain, whether or not any of the rights of au-
thorship are exercised during the statutory period. 
32. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) 
(stating that performing rights societies function as “clearinghouse” in order to put users 
and owners of copyright together where market realities precluded direct contact).  See 
generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:  A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) (dis-
cussing concept of market failure in context of copyright law); Comment, The Fair Use 
of Free Broadcast Television:  The Betamax Case and the Distinction Between Market-
able and Disposable Software, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 52 (1985) (same). 
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two purposes.  First, it acts as a broker between copyright owners 
and copyright users, earning a fee for itself and the composer, by 
licensing to users the right of public performance held by the 
owner.  Although in theory a copyright owner could arrange such 
sales themselves, the owner would seem to profit from the econo-
mies of scale associated with a large licensing organization.33  
Second, the society acts as the eyes and ears of the composer fer-
reting out new customers by aggressively pursuing those who vio-
late the owner’s exclusive rights to public performance. 
2. The Resulting Market Structure and Products:  The 
Blanket License and the Per-Program License 
In essence, performing rights societies sell two products to the 
market of those wishing to perform publicly copyrighted songs 
controlled by the societies.  They are labeled as the “blanket li-
cense” and the “per-program license.” 
By far the most popular license for a broadcaster is the blanket 
license:  the right to perform all of the songs in the repertory of a 
particular society at any time of the broadcasting day or night.34  
The advantage of this license is apparent.  Having purchased ac-
cess to all of the available songs controlled by that entity, the user 
virtually eliminates the risk that it will inadvertently infringe the 
public performance right of a particular work.  Because the vast 
majority of songwriters have licensed either BMI or ASCAP35 to 
 
33. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19 n.32 (1978) (calling it inefficient 
not to use “rather large” organization to monitor use of copyrighted music).  ASCAP’s 
immense size has not always been beneficial to composers.  Many have argued that the 
system favors famous composers at the expense of lesser-known authors.  One example 
has been the long running efforts of jingle writer Steve Karmen for a more equitable slice 
of the ASCAP pie.  According to Karmen, composers of musical standards receive one-
third more royalties than a jingle writer even if the jingle is played publicly as long as the 
standard.  Although this Essay has focused on the adverse impact on copyright users 
caused by unchecked market power, Karmen’s complaint reminds us of the entry barriers 
that prevent any competitors to the performing rights societies oligopoly.  See, Ralph 
Blumenthal, Jingle Writer Wants ASCAP to Pay Him His Due, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. 
May 5, 1997, at E6. 
34. The duration of the license is for a set period of time, usually one year.  See 
ASCAP License, WXYZ Radio (on file with author). 
35. ASCAP was formed in 1914 by many of the world’s foremost popular compos-
ers.  BMI was formed in 1939 by the radio broadcasting industry.  A third performing 
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administer and market their public performance rights, a radio sta-
tion that regularly programs a variety of music will inevitably hold 
a license from the two major societies.  The same holds true for a 
tavern or restaurant with more than a minimal sound system36 or 
one which regularly features live musicians.37  Because the user is 
buying access to all of the societies’ inventory without time restric-
tions, the price of a blanket license is high. 
The other option is the per program license.  Although the 
blanket license gives the user of a broad array of music the security 
of total access at any time, the user who can more easily define its 
programming needs for music theoretically needs only a per-
program license for those periods of the broadcasting day when 
music will be played.  For example, a talk radio format that breaks 
only once a week to air an “oldies” music show might want a li-
cense limited to that particular, albeit regularly scheduled, pro-
gram.  Nevertheless, although the performing rights societies are 
required to provide such a product under the consent decrees, per 
program licenses are rarely purchased.  In most market segments 
the performing rights societies have made such licenses so expen-
sive, the process so cumbersome, and the enforcement actions for 
inadvertent infringement so frightening, most users who can afford 
 
rights society, SESAC, “was founded in 1930, making it the second oldest performing 
rights organization in the United States. SESAC’s repertory, once limited to European 
and gospel music, has diversified to include . . . popular music, . . . Latina music, . . . 
jazz, . . . country and . . . contemporary Christian music.”  SESAC Internet Website, 
http://www.sesac.com (last visited March 25, 1998). 
36. While the broad definition of “perform” added to the 1976 Act was intended to 
overrule the narrow judicial definitions underlying Fortnightly, Teleprompter, and Aiken, 
see supra note 21, Congress did express its intent not to alter the result in Aiken by add-
ing an express infringement exemption for use of home style receiving and amplification 
equipment.  17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (not infringement to publicly receive “on a single receiv-
ing apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes”); see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 
87 (1976) (“it is intended that the performances [in Aiken] would be exempt under clause 
(5)”).  At least one court has interpreted section 110(5) broadly to the detriment of the 
performing rights societies.  See BMI v. Claire’s Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482, 1494 
(7th Cir. 1991) (ruling that a chain of 749 retail stores did not infringe public perform-
ance right by buying and installing home style radio equipment in each store). 
37. Taverns and restaurants that feature live music face a special risk.  While uni-
form radio programming assures some predictability, most eating and drinking estab-
lishments claim ignorance when it comes to predicting what songs live musicians might 
actually play.  Situations in which establishments hold the license of one the societies but 
not the others are infringement actions waiting to happen. 
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to do so, and even those who can not, simply opt for the blanket li-
cense even if it means paying for some things they do not want, do 
not need, and will never use. 
II. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS BETWEEN 1934 AND 1966 
AND THE RESULTING CONSENT DECREES IN UNITED STATES V. 
ASCAP AND UNITED STATES V. BMI, THE SUBSEQUENT FAILURE 
OF PRIVATE LITIGATION, AND THE RESULTANT EXERCISE OF 
UNCHECKED POWER 
The combination of a constitutional grant of a monopoly, a 
comprehensive statute with severe infringement penalties, and the  
freedom from price competition inherent in the blanket license 
would prove to be sufficient to give the performing rights societies 
unfettered control over the market for performing musical compo-
sitions.  As the government sometimes will, in the 1930s it acted to 
challenge this concentration of market power and restore some 
modicum of competition.  The following section explains how the 
government’s half-hearted effort not only failed to promote compe-
tition, but also, in the end, prohibited its natural growth. 
A. United States v. ASCAP 
The government’s first salvo at the performing rights societies 
was fired in 1934.  The Justice Department suit alleged that, 
through the pooling of copyrights, ASCAP had monopolized the 
market for performance rights for copyrighted songs played on the 
radio.38  As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals would later re-
count, after two weeks of trial the government abandoned its case. 
The government found the courthouse again in 1941, renewing 
its claim of an unlawful pooling, and adding the claim that the 
blanket license was an unlawful combination in restraint of trade.39  
The relief sought was an alternative to the blanket license, then the 
sole product packaged by ASCAP, which would allow the copy-
right to pay only for those songs the buyer actually used, a so-
called “per use” license. 
 
38. United States v. ASCAP, Equity No. 78-388 (S.D.N.Y., filed August 30, 1934). 
39. United States v. ASCAP, 1940-43, Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 
1941). 
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After one impotent decree40 and a collateral attack on ASCAP 
by a private plaintiff in a separate market,41 the parties agreed on a 
settlement, without the benefit of “trial or adjudication of any issue 
of fact or law . . . and without admission by any defendant,”42 
which would have a prolonged and determinative effect on how 
copyright owners would be compensated for use of the public per-
formance right, not only in the market for radio use, but also in the 
emerging and not yet imagined media markets of the future. 
The 1950 consent decree is comprised of eighteen sections, six 
of which could be considered procedural in nature and twelve of 
which are substantive.  For purposes of this discussion, four of the 
substantive provisions and three of the procedural sections are im-
portant and are discussed below.43 
1. Section IV General Prohibitions and Section XIV 
Public Inspection of Repertory 
Section IV marked a major departure from the 1941 decree and 
surely would have been pointed to by the government as the sub-
stance of any concession that ASCAP might have made in settling 
 
40. Id. at 403.  The government and ASCAP’s first attempt at settling the matter did 
little to change the virtual lock ASCAP had on the power to negotiate for the sale of the 
performance right.  Although the decree allowed direct negotiation between an owner and 
a user, ASCAP was allowed to compel the owner to pay the resulting fee over to ASCAP 
for distribution.  Unless the owner could keep the fee for itself, the owner had little incen-
tive to abandon ASCAP’s convenient services.  This “change” in market structure was 
therefore “illusory.”  CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 1977). 
41. In an important precedent, a district court held that ASCAP was a combination 
in restraint of trade because it compelled its members to assign to it the exclusive right to 
license the public performance of a song in a motion picture, an assignment ASCAP lev-
eraged to prohibit producers from displaying the film in theaters lacking an ASCAP li-
cense. See Alden-Rochelle v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
42. See United States v. ASCAP, 1950 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 62,595 at 63,751 
(S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
43. The sections of the consent decree not set forth in detail above are section I, 
which sets forth jurisdiction of the court; section II, providing definitions; section III, 
which defines parties to whom the decree applies; section V, which sets forth license is-
suance requirements; section VIII, which bars discrimination in fees; section X, which 
bars conflicts of interest; section XI, which mandates fairness in distribution of fees; sec-
tion XII, which mandates changes in motion picture licensing; section XIII, which man-
dates democratic control by members; section XV, which mandates open membership; 
and section XVIII which sets the effective date of the decree. 
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the government’s enforcement action.  Although in settling the 
case, the government had abandoned its effort to force ASCAP to 
issue “per-use” licenses, this section made an effort to force a 
break in the pooling arrangement the blanket license represented.  
By prohibiting ASCAP from gaining more than a non-exclusive 
right in a copyrighted song and making clear the right of any 
ASCAP member both to leave ASCAP and issue licenses directly 
to users, the decree appeared calculated to unleash the powers of a 
free market.  A separate provision, section XIV, which forced 
ASCAP to make its repertory public and name the individual own-
ers would facilitate that market by providing some mechanism, at 
least on paper, of putting buyer and seller together without the in-
volvement of ASCAP. 
2. Section VI Non-Exclusive Licenses and Section VII 
License Fees 
If the concession made by ASCAP in section IV was an illu-
sory one, as copyright owners would later spend decades arguing, 
then these two sections were the reason why.  Taken together, 
these two sections “ordered,” by force of the decree, ASCAP to is-
sue what it had always issued, and seemingly always wanted to is-
sue—a blanket license and only a blanket license.  Although sec-
tion VII created the option of a “per-program” license and made 
clear that this option had to be offered to the user before the blan-
ket license, this was nothing more than a blanket license for a 
specified program.  As an unscientific but nonetheless empirical 
study would later show, ASCAP never made this option attractive 
to copyright users. 
3. Section IX Court Determination of Reasonable Fee, 
Section XVI Compliance, and Section XVII 
Jurisdiction Retained 
Although facially “procedural,” sections IX, XVI, and XVII 
would also have a profound effect on the market ruled by the de-
crees.  Presumably recognizing that the failure to completely break 
up the pooling arrangement might cause ASCAP to attempt to set 
monopoly prices, section IX took the extraordinary step of desig-
nating an Article III court, the United States District Court for the 
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Southern District of New York, to serve as an unpaid arbitrator, 
settling any dispute ASCAP and users would have over fees by set-
ting a “reasonable rate.”  Sections XVI and XVII set forth the 
standard language of decrees of this type, promising the continuing 
vigilance of the Justice Department over any missteps the defen-
dant might make, a promise that would never be fulfilled. 
The salient features of the ASCAP decree would be repeated in 
a consent decree agreed to by BMI in 1966.44  As set forth below, 
taken together these provisions, and the artificial and illusory con-
straints on ASCAP monopoly power they represented, would cre-
ate a market structure in an atmosphere of governmental neglect 
that, even after years of sometimes bitter litigation by the nominal 
beneficiaries of the decrees, would insulate ASCAP from the more 
natural constraints of price competition. 
B. The Failure of Private Litigation between 1969 and 1984 
The explosive growth of television in the latter half of the 
twentieth century coupled with the inherent weaknesses of the con-
sent decrees seemingly provided the perfect context for private at-
tempts to achieve what the mid-century government enforcement 
efforts had failed to accomplish—a meaningful alternative to the 
blanket license.  The following section recounts that failed effort 
and explains why the continued ascent of “rule of reason” analysis 
in antitrust jurisprudence spelled the end for any hope that the con-
sent decrees would be modified by the stroke of a judge’s pen. 
1. CBS v. ASCAP 
The first serious challenge to the market structure imposed by 
the performing rights societies and reinforced by the decrees came 
three years after the entry of the BMI consent decree and nineteen 
years after the ASCAP decree.45  The challenge came from no less 
 
44. The BMI consent decree is largely the same as the one entered into by ASCAP, 
but for one notable exception.  Unlike the ASCAP decree, the BMI decree does not pro-
vide for a forum for disputes between users and authors.  For all the problems associated 
with litigating against ASCAP in the Southern District of New York, the user with a dis-
pute with BMI has nowhere to turn except to institute a new suit in district court.  For 
many potential plaintiffs this is no remedy at all. 
45. See CBS v ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
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a foe than network television—then the dominant player in that 
medium, a major consumer of copyrighted music, and no stranger 
itself to oligopoly.  It would take some ten years of litigation, but 
in the end the performing rights societies pronounced emphasis on 
the blanket license would survive antitrust scrutiny.46 
i. The Per Se Challenge to the Blanket License and 
the District Court Denial 
The complaint filed by the Columbia Broadcasting System 
(“CBS”) in the Southern District of New York against both 
ASCAP and BMI squarely attacked the flat fee structure imposed 
by the blanket and per-program license system as a violation of 
both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (“Sherman 
Antitrust Act”).47  The relief sought was, on its face, equitable in 
scope and tone—an injunction under section 16 of the Clayton 
Act48 directing the defendant to charge a fee based upon the net-
work’s actual, rather than potential, use of the defendants’ copy-
righted works. 
Thus, the suit did not allege a violation of the consent decrees 
but, rather, sought to force the performing rights societies through 
injunction to create a third product not contemplated by the de-
crees—a “per-use” license.49  Why such a product did not already 
exist in the marketplace of network television use was clear 
enough to the plaintiff.  Songwriters, acting in concert if you will, 
would not allow it, deferring to and insulating themselves through 
the device of the performing rights society in order to carry out an 
 
46. See id. (rejecting a per se challenge to the blanket license system), rev’d, 562 
F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting the blanket license system as a violation of the per se 
rule), rev’d and remanded, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (instructing the Second Circuit to apply the 
rule of reason, rather than the per se rule), aff’g district court on other grounds, 620 F.2d 
930 (1980) (upholding the blanket license system under the rule of reason analysis). 
47. Act to Protect Trade and Commerce Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopo-
lies (“Sherman Antitrust Act”), ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1-2 (West 1998).  The CBS network had held such licenses since the 1940s.  The fee for 
each license was based upon a percentage of the network’s net advertising revenue.  In 
1969, CBS paid ASCAP and BMI a total of $7.3 million for the blanket licenses, slightly 
more than 1% of net revenues. CBS, 400 F. Supp. at 743. 
48. Act to Supplement Existing Laws Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies 
(“Clayton Act”), ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 14 (West 1998). 
49. CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
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anti-competitive scheme.  This refusal to deal, coupled with the 
market dominance of the all-or-nothing blanket license, was, in the 
view of the television networks, a horizontal restraint designed to 
extract monopolistic prices, a per se violation of the antitrust laws.
 The district court disagreed, denying, after almost six years of 
litigation and an eight-week trial on the merits, each of the six anti-
trust claims advanced by CBS.50  First, the court held that CBS had 
failed to prove an illegal combination designed to fix prices.51  Be-
cause the consent decrees mandated the option of direct licensing 
and CBS had failed to disprove the viability of that approach, CBS 
had only supposed and failed to prove that composers would not 
compete against each other in a direct licensing scheme.52 
Plaintiff’s second claim, related to the first, that the blanket li-
cense fixed prices by forcing the purchase of an unwanted “pack-
age” also failed without proof that CBS could not purchase the in-
dividual elements of the package directly from the composers.53  A 
“group boycott” claim, the fourth claim for relief, and a fifth claim 
for “copyright misuse,” failed on the same basis as the second, tie-
in, claim.54  The plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence that the 
individual composers had acted in a concerted effort to prohibit 
competition among themselves.55 
Plaintiff’s third claim, also an unlawful tying theory—that 
ASCAP and BMI forced it through the blanket system to purchase 
the rights to unwanted songs—failed because of proofs suggesting 
that CBS had never sought to negotiate a “per-use” license with 
ASCAP, a theme the district court repeatedly referenced.56 
 
50. See id. 
51. See id. 
52. See id. at 781. 
53. See id. at 742 (holding that in a case of package licensing the test was one of 
“convenience” versus “compulsion”); see also id. at 749 (citing Automatic Radio Co., 
Inc. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950), and distinguishing Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969)).  A plaintiff who had chosen as a 
convenience to itself to purchase the rights to items it might not later use had not suffered 
an antitrust injury.  The plaintiff forced to choose between such a license and no license 
at all would have a viable claim.  Because CBS had failed to prove its lack of options, no 
injury had been proven.  Id. at 748-49, 781. 
54. See id. at 781. 
55. See id. 
56. See id.  The court was plainly bothered by the timing of the lawsuit and ex-
HILLMAN.TYP 9/29/2006  4:41 PM 
1998] THE AGING ASCAP & BMI CONSENT DECREES 749 
Lastly the court rejected the opportunity to hold that ASCAP 
and BMI had attempted and achieved a monopoly.57  Defining the 
market more broadly—“performance rights to compositions suit-
able for television network use”—than the narrow definition of 
“BMI and ASCAP’s blanket licenses” sought by the plaintiff, the 
court held that CBS could negotiate price with individual compos-
ers and license performance rights from sources other than BMI 
and ASCAP.58  Because the performing rights societies could not 
control price or eliminate competition in the market, one broadly 
defined by the court, they were hardly monopolists. 
ii. Application of the Per Se Rule in the Circuit Court 
of Appeals 
Almost two years later, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed.59  In an opinion elegant in its simplicity, the appellate 
court, unlike the district court, focused directly on the effect the 
blanket license had on price.60  When sellers agree to sell collec-
tively at a set price, inherent in the arrangement is an agreement 
 
pressed, at least indirectly, its doubts about the sincerity of CBS’s legal positions.  The 
court took great pains to note that:  (1) the suit was brought only after negotiations for a 
new blanket license had failed, (2) CBS had helped to form and once owned a significant 
piece of BMI which issued blanket licenses to CBS during that time,  and (3) CBS had 
never sought in good faith to negotiate for the relief it now sought judicially and had, in 
fact, used blanket licenses for decades without complaint.  See id. at 753-54 (“CBS did 
not even view music licensing a business problem until immediately prior to suit.”). 
57. See id. 
58. Id. at 780.  The court offered: 
CBS might negotiate with the producers of its programs and films using “in-
side” music to secure favorable prices for licenses for music “in the can,” and 
for music contained in new programs to be shown in the upcoming season; it 
could build up a large reservoir of music by requiring program packagers affili-
ated with major publishers to make their catalogs available for direct licensing 
in accordance with a fee schedule; it would negotiate with independent pub-
lishers for either “mini-blanket” licenses covering their catalogs or direct li-
censes using a fee schedule; it could send notices to all publishers of its inten-
tion to seek direct licenses for compositions in their catalogs; it could negotiate 
a per-program license with ASCAP and BMI whose fee would reflect the 
amount of music actually performed and failing that, it could bring proceedings 
under the consent decree. 
Id. 
59. CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977). 
60. See id. 
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not to compete on price.61  When the price for the collective prod-
uct includes compensation for someone whose products are not 
consumed, the consumer may have paid too much.62  But even if 
the collective fare is reasonable, the pooling arrangement “fixes” 
some fee for the pool member whose work is not used, even if the 
free market would have set the price at zero.63  To the appellate 
court, such a market structure was an intolerable affront to the free 
market.64  A structure that allowed for a price to be set by some-
thing other than the market was per se unlawful under section 1 of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act (“section 1”).65 
In the view of the court, the blanket license could survive a 
section 1 attack only if the market failed to provide a mechanism to 
supply a fair price.66  Ironically, because ASCAP had argued vig-
orously to the district court that individual licensing was a viable 
option, such a mechanism could be relied upon to set prices.67  The 
blanket license would have to go.68 
Although not the classic “split in the Circuits,” the Court of 
Appeals decision in CBS was at odds with an earlier Ninth Circuit 
which had rejected a per se challenge to the blanket license market 
structure in the context of the local radio market.69  But even with-
out the Ninth Circuit decision, the importance of the CBS case in 
the constant tug-of-war between owners and users of copyrighted 
materials and the challenge it represented to the growing use of 
rule of reason analysis insured Supreme Court review. 
 
61. See id. at 140 (“[B]lanket licenses . . . reduce[] price competition among the 
members [to the agreement] and provide[] a disinclination to compete.”). 
62. See id. at 136 (“When the single price includes compensation even for those in 
the combination whose wares are not used, it may be said that the single price has been 
increased to take care of such compensatory factors which are irrelevant to true competi-
tion.”). 
63. See id. at 135-36. 
64. See id. at 136. 
65. See id. (citing section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 
1998)). 
66. See id. 
67. See id. 
68. See id. at 140. 
69. K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publ’g Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 
389 U.S. 1045 (1968). 
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iii. Application of the Rule of Reason in the Supreme 
Court 
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ holding that 
the blanket license constituted a per se violation of section 1.70  To 
Justice White who wrote the opinion, the simplicity of the court of 
appeals decision was not a strength but a weakness.  “Price-fixing” 
was not a literal exercise but a conclusion reached “only after con-
siderable experience with certain business relationships.”71  Echo-
ing the factual foundations of the district court opinion, the Court 
was plainly concerned that none of the “considerable experience” 
set forth in the record suggested a per se violation.  First, the gov-
ernment had earlier sued on such a theory and settled for less.  
Second, the consent decree, at least on its face, was designed to 
prohibit unfair pricing.  Third, the plaintiff itself had operated un-
der the blanket license system for years without complaint.  And 
lastly, even the Justice Department, charged under the consent de-
crees with monitoring the defendants and the market, had filed an 
amicus brief urging the reversal of the court of appeals. 
Although the Court acknowledged that none of these things 
standing alone could insulate truly illegal conduct, the complexity 
and uniqueness of the market, coupled with the passage of time, 
compelled the conclusion that only the use of the fact-sensitive, 
careful, balancing approach of rule of reason analysis would insure 
the proper result.72  In the end, a blanket license just might be the 
kind of pooling arrangement that, with certain restrictions, could 
have economic benefit.  Because the challenged restraint was “not 
a ‘naked restrain[t] of trade with no purpose except stifling of 
competition’”73 and did not necessarily threaten the market’s abil-
ity to set prices—the “‘central nervous system of the econ-
omy’”74—it had to be subjected to the more rigorous rule of reason 
 
70. See CBS v. ASCAP, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (White, J.). 
71. Id. at 9 (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-608 
(1972)). 
72. See Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 607-08. 
73. CBS, 389 U.S. at 20 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 
263 (1963)). 
74. Id. at 23 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 
n.59 (1940)). 
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test.  Central to the Court’s decision was the view that the rights 
sought to be protected by the market arrangement, the rights of 
copyright, were important statutory grants created by Congress.75  
Any effort to subvert or limit those rights would have to be justi-
fied by some higher, or at least equal, public good lest the private 
enforcement of the antitrust laws subvert the will of Congress.76 
On remand, the court of appeals upheld the use of a blanket li-
cense under the rule of reason.77  The ruling was not surprising be-
cause the district court essentially utilized a rule of reason analysis 
in the first round of litigation.  Furthermore, each reason used by 
the Supreme Court in disallowing the use of the per se rule was, 
when reapplied under rule of reason, in and of itself a compelling 
argument for the practical necessity of the blanket licensing sys-
tem. 
With clear direction from the Supreme Court, the detailed deci-
sion of the trial court, and the failure of CBS in the subsequent ap-
peals to challenge anything other that the trial court’s per se rul-
ings, the court of appeals needed only to affirm the district court.78  
Because the plaintiff had failed to establish at the trial court level 
that no alternative to the blanket license existed, the challenged re-
straint was, by definition, not a restraint at all.79  Absent a true re-
straint there could be no anti-competitive effects and no violation 
of the rule of reason.80  After years of litigation and a healthy 
scare, at least in the marketplace of network television, the blanket 
license was once again king. 
2. Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP 
After the court of appeals had found the blanket license to be a 
per se restraint but before the Supreme Court reversal in CBS v. 
ASCAP, owners of certain local television stations brought suit in 
the Southern District of New York.81  Their lawsuit, Buffalo 
 
75. See id. at 28. 
76. See id. at 18-19. 
77. CBS v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980). 
78. See id. at 934-35. 
79. Id. at 939. 
80. Id. 
81. See Buffalo Broad. Co. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev’d, 
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Broadcasting v. ASCAP,82 echoed the claims of the CBS network 
and asserted that ASCAP and BMI, through the blanket license, 
also had restrained trade in the local television market.83  The dis-
trict court certified a class representing some 750 local television 
stations.84 
By the time the matter went to trial and was ripe for decision, 
the Second Circuit had, in the CBS litigation, applied the rule of 
reason test mandated by the Supreme Court.  Accordingly, in Buf-
falo Broadcasting, the district court applied the same test, which it 
defined as two-pronged, asking (1) whether the blanket license re-
strained competition because of the lack of a “realistically avail-
able” alternative and (2) on balance, if no alternative existed, 
whether the anti-competitive effects of the blanket license system 
outweighed the beneficial, or pro-competitive effects.85  Answer-
ing the first question in the affirmative, the court went on to hold, 
under the second prong, that the restraint was unreasonable. 
The district court’s opinion began by contrasting the historical 
posture of local television stations toward the blanket license sys-
tem with the passive attitude displayed by the networks and al-
luded to in the CBS trial court decision.  Unlike the networks, 
whose opposition to the blanket license system seemingly sprung 
up two weeks before the institution of suit, local television stations 
had engaged in a lengthy cold war of sorts with the performing 
rights societies over the lack of direct negotiations with composers.  
They formed their own negotiating agent, distinct from the net-
works, had sought to negotiate alternatives to the blanket license, 
and had sued for fee determinations under the consent decrees.  
Local television stations, the court concluded, had not chosen the 
blanket license, but had fought hard against it as best as circum-
stances would allow.86 
 
744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984). 
82. Id. 
83. See id. at 276. 
84. See id. at 277. 
85. Id. at 286. 
86. Id. at 288 (noting at least two failed efforts, Application of Voice of Alabama, 
Inc. and Application of Shenandoah Valley Broad., Inc., made under the terms of the con-
sent decree).  The industry segment’s negotiating arm, known as the “All Industry Com-
mittee,” attempted to pursue one of the matters to the Supreme Court.  See Application of 
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The court then proceeded to discount each of the alternatives to 
blanket licensing proffered by the performing rights societies.  The 
per program license was too costly, not only because it was more 
expensive but because the onerous reporting requirements threat-
ened to consume whatever marginal difference existed in the price.  
Direct licensing was not a realistic alternative for syndicated pro-
gramming, the bulk of local content, because local stations, barred 
ironically by the antitrust laws from collective action, lacked the 
negotiating muscle of the networks.  Without such market power, 
the court concluded, the stations could not compel the creation of 
the market machinery necessary to put buyers and sellers together. 
In the court’s view, this same lack of negotiating power 
doomed the alternative of so-called “source licensing,” a method of 
obtaining programs from syndicators who had already secured the 
public performance right from the composer.  But syndicators had 
not traditionally sold programming with that right attached, instead 
deferring to an industry practice of “splitting” the public perform-
ance right off to publishers affiliated with ASCAP and BMI, pub-
lishers controlled by the syndicators.  Because syndicators were 
“more concerned by the prospect of abandoning long-standing 
business methods than by the possibility of disappointing their lo-
cal station customers,” source licensing was an illusory alterna-
tive.87 
With no options available to the local stations, the question be-
came one of reasonableness.  Although the district court acknowl-
edged that a market of blanket licenses was efficient, did not re-
strict output, reduced costs, and conferred flexibility on the users 
of the product, it could not overcome the scourge of blatant price-
fixing.  In the court’s view, eliminating the blanket license would 
necessarily have the effect of causing composers to compete on the 
price of public performance, the only right in the bundle of copy-
rights held by the composer not subject to free market price com-
petition.  That principle was too fundamental to the antitrust laws 
not to carry the day.88 
 
Shenandoah Valley Broad., Inc., 331 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 997 
(1964). 
87. Buffalo Broad., 546 F. Supp. at 292. 
88. See id. at 296 (citing Northern Pac. R.R. Co. V. United States, 356 U.S. 1 
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The Second Circuit, sounding a little weary of the entire issue, 
and perhaps a little gun-shy after CBS, reversed.89  Although it 
took pains to disavow any inclination to simply conclude that the 
remand opinion in CBS would serve as controlling precedent,90 the 
appellate decision was little more than a rerun of the earlier case.  
As the court in CBS had found under its facts, and despite the fac-
tual findings of the district court in Buffalo Broadcasting to the 
contrary, the same alternatives to the blanket license identified in 
CBS existed in the market of performance rights for local televi-
sion use.  These alternatives—program, source, and direct licens-
ing—precluded, as a matter of law, the conclusion that the blanket 
license was a restraint.  No rule of reason analysis would be re-
quired.  Although the decision lacked the power and reasoning of 
the CBS ruling,91 the fallout was clear.  Once and for all, the 
 
(1958) (ruling that fundamental purpose of Sherman Antitrust Act is preservation of 
competition)). 
89. See Buffalo Broad. Co. v. ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917, 919 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Once 
again we consider the lawfulness . . . of the blanket license . . . .”). 
90. The court paid at least lip service to the notion that the plaintiff in CBS, a pow-
erful network, was not similarly situated to the disparate and fragmented local stations. 
Id. at 925 (“[I]t does not follow that the local stations lose simply because the CBS net-
work lost.”). 
91. The Buffalo Broadcasting analysis was flawed for several reasons.  First, and 
although it claimed not to be doing so, the court essentially overruled several key factual 
findings of the district court under the rubric of reversing an error of law.  This blatant 
disregard for the deference usually accorded the district court’s factual findings clouded 
the court’s opinion and legitimately raises the issue of whether the court was result-
oriented after CBS.  Those facts that it liked, it kept.  Those that it didn’t were rejected as 
not supported by the evidence.  Secondly, the court seemed to misstate the legal positions 
of the plaintiffs.  For example, in analyzing the claim of a restraint on price competition, 
the court noted that syndicators routinely benefited from competition among composers 
as proof that competition existed in the market.  That, however, was not the market chal-
lenged by the plaintiffs.  That market was the sale of performing rights to the stations by 
the syndicators.  Rather than supporting the defendants, the fact that the sellers enjoyed 
price competition when they were buyers of the same product should have only high-
lighted the lack of competition in the challenged market.  See id. at 932.  Syndicators 
were happy to realize the benefits of free competition among musicians but once having 
acquired the performance right for their own benefit, they were unwilling to allow com-
petition among themselves. 
Equally surprising was the court’s placing of the market for performance rights on 
its collective head.  It is the ordinary course in an open and efficient market for sellers to 
begin transactions by offering to sell at a given price.  Indeed, price competition among 
sellers is the hallmark of a free market.  Here, however, the court criticized the local tele-
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ASCAP and BMI blanket license would remain intact as one of the 
few packaged products to withstand relentless antitrust attacks.92 
C. Use and Misuse:  The Post-1984 Conduct of the 
Performing Rights Societies and the Unavailing Remedies 
Left unchecked by litigation and their market power entrenched 
by the unworkable consent decrees, the performing rights societies 
entered the late twentieth century with firm control over the market 
of public performance of musical compositions.  Like all good 
monopolists before and after them, that market power was abused.  
The following section catalogues some of those abuses. 
In litigation, as in baseball, it is often difficult to identify the 
players without a scorecard.  By the mid-1980s, ASCAP had as-
sembled an impressive line up of victories after four decades of de-
fending its method of doing business.  It had successfully con-
verted a government-brokered consent decree from a shield to 
protect the public into a sword against the enemies of its market 
power.  It had taken on and defeated CBS, at the time the most 
powerful media organization in the world, vindicating the preemi-
nence of the blanket license in the marketing of performance rights 
for musical compositions.  That victory in the network television 
market sector would be repeated in the markets of local televi-
sion,93 local radio,94 and live music.95 
These successes, coupled with enormous economic strength fu-
eled by the media explosion, have created an atmosphere in which 
 
vision stations, the users of copyrighted songs, for not opening negotiations with the syn-
dicators by offering to buy at a certain price, instead of recognizing that the failure of the 
sellers to offer at any price was proof itself of their collective restraint.  Id. at 930-31. 
92. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of 
Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).  Ironically, the Second Circuit would later allow the 
price-fixing inherent in the blanket license to be used by the rate-fixing court as a factor 
in setting, under the ASCAP consent decree, reasonable rates for a blanket license to a 
cable channel.  ASCAP v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 912 F.2d 563, 570 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (affirming magistrate judge’s determination that “ASCAP enjoy[ed] more 
market power than it would have in . . . freely competitive market”). 
93. See Buffalo Broad., 744 F.2d 917. 
94. See K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publ’g Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. de-
nied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968). 
95. See BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982) (mem.). 
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ASCAP and BMI engage in entrenched, unchecked, and systematic 
anti-competitive and other unlawful behavior in those smaller mar-
ket segments not directly controlled by the litigated cases.  In each 
of these examples, the context continues to be the pre-packaged 
“all or nothing” blanket license. 
1. Continuing Violations of the Consent Decree? 
A facet of this “all or nothing” approach is evidenced by the 
experience of a small AM radio station on the rural outskirts of a 
major media market.  This Essay refers to this station as WXYZ. 
WXYZ is a locally owned and operated independent radio sta-
tion.  Although it buys some syndicated programming, most of its 
content is produced at the station.  The station prides itself on ser-
vicing the local citizenry and does a good job at it.  It broadcasts 
things one would not find on a network station, such as high school 
sports and local town meetings, which aid civic pride and add to a 
sense of community.  Partly because of the technical limitation of 
the AM bandwidth and partly because of the large cost of main-
taining a music library, it carries only one music program.  The 
program, which airs only on Sunday night at the same time each 
week, plays only the pre-selected recorded music of Frank Sinatra. 
The station’s limited and predictable use of music would seem 
to render it a prime candidate for either a per-program license, or 
ideally, a per-use license.  Not surprisingly, neither is a realistic 
option.  ASCAP will not provide a per-use license and no legal op-
tion exists to compel them to do so. 
Even though the option of a per-program, or “mini-blanket,” li-
cense is supposed to be offered first under the terms of the consent 
decree, you would never know it from the correspondence WXYZ 
receives from ASCAP.  Every year at license renewal time, WXYZ 
receives a letter from ASCAP dictating the new rates for the yearly 
licenses.  These rates, WXYZ is told, come from the Radio Music 
License Committee (“RMLC”), a negotiating entity controlled by 
major market radio stations—predominantly chain or network sta-
tions—which program mostly music and therefore always pur-
chase a blanket license.  The negotiated rate therefore favors a 
blanket licensee, rendering the per-program license rate even more 
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expensive for a station that programs little or no music.  Then, add-
ing insult to injury, the letter states, presumably relying on the con-
sent decree that prohibits price discrimination, that the agreement 
with the RMLC is binding on WXYZ even though WXYZ is not a 
member and has different music needs.  Nowhere does the letter 
notify the station of the consent decree or the rate-setting function 
of the district court.  When counsel to the station informs them of 
the decree and the cost of litigation in the Southern District of New 
York, WXYZ cuts the check for the unwanted and unneeded blan-
ket license. 
i. “Hey Buddy, You Got a License For That Song?” 
Even if they were aware of it, the difficulty copyright users 
have in seeking any relief under the current consent decree is evi-
denced by a recent battle between ASCAP and the New Jersey 
Restaurant Association (“NJRA”).96  For years, restaurants and 
taverns have complained about the tactics used by the performing 
rights societies to collect royalties and enforce licenses.  In a typi-
cal scenario, music monitors hired by the performing rights socie-
ties sit in a tavern or restaurant making notes of offending songs.  
The owner of the establishment is then confronted and a demand 
made for immediate payment of a blanket license fee, and the 
owner is reminded, in a less than subtle way, of the stiff per viola-
tion statutory damages in the Copyright Act.  No advance notice is 
given, no questions are answered, and none of the remedies that 
might be available to the user, including those under the consent 
decree, are revealed.  Pay or be sued is the short, and only answer.  
To some, it smacks of extortion. 
Recently, the NJRA convinced the New Jersey legislature to 
pass a bill designed to combat some of the overreaching conduct.  
Key provisions of the bill included disclosure of the songs covered 
by the blanket licenses and a list of rates paid by similarly situated 
users.97  What is striking about these provisions is that the pro-
 
96. Resorting to the consent decree is the only judicial remedy realistically available 
to owners of restaurants and taverns.  See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 
F. Supp. 758 (D. Del. 1982) (rejecting antitrust challenge to blanket license in market of 
small live music establishments), aff’d, 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982) (mem.). 
97. A similar bill is pending in the Michigan state legislature and was recently en-
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posed state law would have merely imposed requirements already 
mandated by the federal consent decrees.  Clearly, the legislature 
had found, at least in New Jersey, a widespread disregard by 
ASCAP and BMI of these judicially mandated requirements. 
While this bill was awaiting the governor’s signature, ASCAP 
petitioned the district court to allow it to withdraw from the New 
Jersey market.  One would be hard-pressed to conceive of more 
conclusive proof of ASCAP’s monopolistic power and conduct.  
ASCAP knew that if it withdrew from the market every public per-
formance of one of its songs would amount to a per se violation of 
copyright law, exposing the responsible party to severe civil and 
potential criminal penalties.98  By any number of theories of corpo-
rate or imputed liability, any tavern or restaurant that ran the risk 
of playing any music also ran the risk of a severe, even fatal, blow 
to their business.99 
Despite this rather draconian threat to an important segment of 
 
dorsed by the Michigan Chamber of Commerce.  H.B. 5576, 89th Leg., 1998 Reg. Sess. 
(Mich. 1998)(seeking to establish a code of conduct for music licensing agents).  A press 
release issued in support of the bill, stated that: 
[I]t’s equally important that the people who work for music licensing agencies 
conduct themselves in a businesslike and professional manner [which] . . . 
[u]nfortunately . . . has not always been the case . . . . For decades, these giant 
performing rights societies have used the federal copyright law as a license to 
intimidate and threaten small businesses. 
Michigan Chamber Backs Legislation Establishing Code of Conduct for Music Licensing 
Agencies:  It’s Time for Performing Rights Societies to Change Their Tune, PR News-
wire, Mar. 9, 1998, available in WESTLAW, 3/9/98 PRWIRE 15:45:00.  The supporters 
of the bill also stated that: 
[Michigan House Bill No. 5576] would require agents of the music societies to 
be licensed by the state, show identification, and announce their presence when 
entering a business premises.  The bill would also require the societies to keep 
a current list of the song titles covered by any royalty fee payment and present 
a fee schedule or formula used to compute the fee.  [The supporters of the bill 
claim that] [s]imilar legislation has been adopted in 23 other states within the 
last three years. 
Id. 
98. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-511 (1994) (defining and setting forth remedies for in-
fringement). 
99. See generally Angela R. Dean, Note, Expanding the Doctrines of Vicarious and 
Contributory Copyright Infringement:  Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. Targets the 
Primary Distribution Channels for Counterfeit Merchandise, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
119 (1997) (discussing theories of indirect liability for owner who fails to prohibit copy-
right infringement on premises). 
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the New Jersey economy, not to mention one that contributes much 
to a society’s quality of life, the district court judge currently as-
signed to monitor the ASCAP consent decree, denied a petition by 
the NJRA to intervene in the underlying case.  Simply put, absent a 
sympathetic Justice Department, no one was allowed to stand be-
fore the court and assert the substantial interests of the public.  
ASCAP could safely threaten to withdraw completely from the 
New Jersey market without any check, market-based or judicial, to 
counteract their arrogant posture.100 
ii. You Bring the Marshmallows, I’ll Bring the 
ASCAP License:  God Bless America and the Girl 
Scouts 
ASCAP’s lack of sensitivity to how the public at large might 
view its exercises of market power came into sharp focus last year 
when several news articles reported that ASCAP had decided to 
take on the Girl Scouts for allegedly infringing the public perform-
ance right by singing campfire songs without a license.101  Al-
though the true facts were less dramatic, ASCAP had indeed iden-
tified what it perceived as an untapped market, ideal for the 
expansion of its monopoly—the unlicensed public singing of copy-
righted songs at camps.  Its efforts to tap that market for revenue 
spawned a colossal marketing and legal disaster. 
It appears that sometime in 1995, ASCAP approached the 
American Camping Association and insisted that each of the asso-
ciation’s 2,300 member camps, some of which were Girl Scout 
camps, obtain a blanket license from ASCAP.  The association’s 
 
100. See generally Joe Tyrell, ASCAP and Trenton Still in Disharmony, STAR 
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 18, 1995, at 14; Joe Tyrell, Music Licensing Firm Wins 
Round In Court, STAR LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 21, 1995, at 15. 
101. Although almost surreal in its connotations, ASCAP’s public relations disaster 
over the Girl Scout flap highlighted the inequities of ASCAP’s stonewalling on the issue 
of per-use licenses.  With apologies to Mick Jagger, even if the Girl Scouts would be 
willing to pay a fee for “God Bless America” to keep ASCAP’s “music police” at a safe 
distance from the campfire, was there not more than a little irony in forcing them to li-
cense “Let’s Spend the Night Together” as well? See generally Julien H. Collins III, 
When In Doubt, Do Without:  Licensing Public Performances By Nonprofit Camping or 
Volunteer Service Organizations Under Federal Copyright Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1277 
(1997) (arguing certain definable songs in ASCAP repertory are part of national fabric). 
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executives were at first shocked, but after consulting counsel, their 
shock turned to fear.  According to the association’s lawyer, sing-
ing at summer camp could indeed violate the public performance 
right.102  The association later explained in a letter to its members 
that if the members opted to pass on the $250 per camp fee that the 
association had negotiated with ASCAP, members could face in-
fringement actions and damages of $100,000 per performance.103  
Not surprisingly, many of the camps paid the fee, including at least 
sixteen Girl Scout camps. 
In March 1996, not satisfied with, or probably inspired by, its 
success with the camping association, ASCAP wrote a letter to the 
other 6,000 camps in the United States demanding license fees of 
up to $1,439 per camp.  Many Girl Scout camps refused and began 
instructing their counselors to avoid singing any songs not owned 
by the Girl Scouts.  When an article appeared on the front page of 
the Wall Street Journal,104 ASCAP quickly “descended into what 
its public-relations consultant, [Ken] Sunshine, described as ‘PR 
hell.’”105 
By then, however, the damage had been done, and ASCAP’s 
subsequent announcement to return license fees to the Girl Scouts 
who had paid and license its entire repertory to them for $1 per 
camp did little to stem the criticism.106  If anything, the concession 
only highlighted the highhandedness of ASCAP’s initial approach 
 
102. Under the 1976 Act, “to perform . . . a work ‘publicly’ means—(1) . . . at a 
place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of 
a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered[.]” 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
103. Under the 1976 Act, a victim of willful infringement may elect statutory dam-
ages over actual damages in an amount up to $100,000 for each act of infringement.  Id. § 
504(c)(2).  Such damage awards are a statutory form of punitive damages designed to 
discourage the unlawful behavior.  See Alan J. Hartnick, Where a Cost-Benefit Analysis 
May Encourage Copyright Infringements:  The Tale of the Doctrine of Multiple In-
fringements, 10 ENT. L. REP. 3 (1989). 
104. Lisa Bannon, The Birds May Sing, But Campers Can’t Unless They Pay Up—
ASCAP Warns the Girl Scouts That “God Bless America” Can Hit Legal Sour Notes, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1996, at A1. 
105. See The Girl Scouts vs. ASCAP:  Music Writers’ Copyright Initiative Proves 
To Be Public Relations Debacle of Stunning Proportions, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Jan. 5, 
1997, at C8. 
106. See ASCAP and Camping Group Reach Agreement on Songs, WALL ST. J., 
July 15, 1997, at B3. 
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to the camping industry, an approach spawned by its unfettered 
power to set prices.107  In the end, the entire controversy fanned the 
growing flames of discontent over the unbridled activities of the 
performing rights societies.108 
These examples demonstrate that ASCAP and BMI have con-
tinued to attempt to derive income from non-music programming, 
have failed to provide meaningful per-program licenses, and have 
sought to require royalties from entities engaged in non-
compensable public performances.  Each of these activities is a 
substantive violation of the consent decrees. 
III. VARIOUS REMEDIES AND THEIR PITFALLS 
If this parade of horribles in the market sectors of independent 
radio stations, restaurants and taverns, and non-profit organizations 
does cry out for some remedy against ASCAP’s continued abuse of 
its statutory and judicially-created monopoly, what remedies exist 
today to curb these abuses?  Available judicial remedies appear to 
be scarce. 
A. Option 1:  Modification of the Consent Decree by the 
Department of Justice 
The most obvious choice would be a petition to the Justice De-
partment to reopen its section 1 case.  Even though the Justice De-
partment claims to be contemplating some review of the decrees, it 
has left the decrees intact for almost five decades without having 
once sought to modify the decrees.  The Antitrust Division has not 
held out any hope to the numerous small businesses that use copy-
righted music—not after years of private enforcement efforts, in-
cluding two judicial opinions finding the blanket license a restraint 
of trade, not after numerous states had passed legislation targeting 
abuses by the performing rights societies, not after years of techno-
logical change, not after the performing rights societies had be-
 
107. See James V. Delong, The Best Things in Life Aren’t Free, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 
10, 1997, at A17 (“The real problem is not principle, but price . . . . ASCAP’s mistake 
was in asserting its members’ right to charge a monopoly rate.”). 
108. See Industry Fights to Modify Music Monopoly, HOTEL & MOTEL MGT., May 
19, 1997, at 29. 
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come enormous multinational cash machines, not after congres-
sional hearings detailing abuses by the performing rights societies, 
and not even after ASCAP had gone after an American institution 
as venerable and benign as the Girl Scouts.  On the contrary, 
whenever it had the opportunity, the government sought to perpe-
trate the market its outmoded consent decrees had helped to create. 
B. Option 2:  Intervention and Modification 
Of course without Justice Department support, the continuing 
jurisdiction provisions of the consent decrees are meaningless.  In 
a prime example of bad facts making bad law, a songwriter whose 
rambling pleadings suggested a form of mild paranoia sought leave 
in 1951 to intervene in United States v. ASCAP, ostensibly to chal-
lenge the decree itself.109  The plaintiff, unnamed in the reported 
decision but named in a later decision as Edward Vance,110 had re-
peatedly claimed in dismissed pleadings that ASCAP had con-
spired with numerous parties, including federal employees, to steal 
lyrics he had allegedly written, but failed to copyright properly, 
sometime before 1942.  After nine complaints and amended com-
plaints had been filed in four de novo proceedings in Missouri and 
New York, the persistent plaintiff sought to invoke two provisions 
in the 1950 consent decree and the Federal Civil Rules in a failed 
effort to intervene in the government’s enforcement action. 
Some of the provisions, at least on the surface, held out some 
hope that someone other than the government and ASCAP would 
have some say in the breadth and functioning of the consent de-
cree.  But it was not to be.  Turning first to the decree itself, Judge 
Weinfeld summarily dismissed the claim that section IX, subsec-
tion D, provided any relief to this plaintiff.  Because he was not an 
applicant for a license or a licensee, the plaintiff could claim no 
substantive right under a section of the decree designed primarily 
to allow such persons to defend an ASCAP infringement action by 
challenging the validity of the copyright of the allegedly infringed 
work.111  The fact that the essence of the plaintiff’s claim was that 
 
109. United States v. ASCAP, 11 F.R.D. 511, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (Weinfeld, J.). 
110. Vance v. ASCAP, 13 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). 
111. See United States v. ASCAP, 11 F.R.D. at 512-13. 
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ASCAP was enforcing a copyright, albeit against others, that had 
been “stolen” from the plaintiff was apparently of no import to 
Judge Weinfeld.  Equally unavailing was section XVII of the de-
cree that, by its express terms, limited the court’s continuing juris-
diction to future applications by the parties.  After ten years of liti-
gation and negotiations, neither the government—which opposed 
the intervention attempt—nor ASCAP was likely to upset the apple 
cart. 
But it was Judge Weinfeld’s rejection of the plaintiff’s attempt 
under the doctrine of permissive joinder112 that, more than any-
thing else, set the tone for any attempts to upset the balance struck 
by the consent decree.  Indeed the language is so sweeping, and the 
source so well regarded, that one could not imagine a statement 
more chilling to whatever efforts one might contemplate to chal-
lenge any government-wrought antitrust decree.  In Judge Wein-
feld’s view, “public policy” required that government lawyers, 
charged with vindicating the public interest, be free of any private 
“interference.” 113 
Far from being unique, this view of the sanctity of government 
crafted consent decrees is an ingrained, and perhaps impenetrable 
barrier to private party actions to challenge unenforced and out-
dated decrees.114 
 
112. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).  The court summarily dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for 
mandatory joinder under Rule 24(a).  See FED R. CIV. P. 24(a).  While no statute con-
ferred a right of intervention, the court could have viewed the other provisions of the rule 
more liberally.  It could be said, for example, that as the putative author of a song in the 
ASCAP repertory, the Court had within its custody and control property belonging to the 
plaintiff  (presuming of course the validity of the underlying claim of authorship).  See 
FED R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).  More importantly, the court could have defined “party” under 
Rule 24(a)(2) to include the intended beneficiaries of the market structure imposed by the 
decree.  See FED R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). 
113. United States v. ASCAP, 11 F.R.D. at 513.  Judge Weinfeld’s logic relied upon 
the fallacy that “self-interest[ed]” private interests would never mirror a larger public 
good.  While the plaintiff was clearly self-interested, it is also clear that the plaintiff was 
sincere, or perhaps clever, enough to invoke a wider interest.  Although it is unclear from 
the abbreviated decision how the system harmed the plaintiff, the relief sought plainly 
included a change to the “blanket” licensing system at the heart of the present oppressive 
market system.  Id. at 512. 
114. See generally United States v. Bearing Distrib. Co., 18 F.R.D. 228, 231 (W.D. 
Mo. 1955) (denying intervention to private plaintiff claiming violation, and seeking ex-
pansion, of government negotiated consent decree; court chastising plaintiff for “as-
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C. Option 3:  New Litigation 
Precedent suggests that at least with regard to broadcast media, 
any new litigation brought against ASCAP would be barred by the 
joint application of the doctrines of res judicata (“claim preclu-
sion”) and parens patriae.  Under these cases, private parties seek-
ing to sue a defendant previously sued in a government enforce-
ment action ending in a consent decree must demonstrate that they 
are not in privity with the first plaintiff.  If the second plaintiff is in 
privity with the first plaintiff, its claim is barred.  In this context 
privity means whether the precluded party’s interest is substan-
tially the same as the first plaintiff and whether the first plaintiff 
was vested with the authority of representation and exercised that 
authority adequately. 
Where the first plaintiff is the government it is difficult to jus-
tify a new action under a strict application of this test.  A civil anti-
trust suit is surely brought not to benefit the Department of Justice 
but to benefit market players who face anti-competitive forces; in 
the case of the ASCAP litigation, public performers of copyrighted 
music.  Moreover, whatever the reality might be, there is a pre-
sumption that the state will adequately represent their position.115  
Even if a judge could be convinced a new action is justified she 
might dismiss for forum non conveniens or grant a transfer to the 
 
sum[ing] prerogatives of the Attorney General”); see also United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 
20 F.R.D. 423, 424, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (denying intervention to private party attempt-
ing to “displace the Attorney General as vindicator of the public interest” where retention 
of jurisdiction clause in consent decree limited to parties and “no others”); United States 
v. Shubert, 305 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (denying motion of private party to 
appear as amicus curiae to oppose application of theater owner subject to consent decree 
because private party, unlike the government, apt to confuse private interest with the pub-
lic good); cf. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 59 F.D.R. 305, 307 (D.D.C. 1973) 
(barring defendant in SEC enforcement action from cross-claiming against private parties 
because public policy militates against delaying, confusing, and complicating case 
brought by the government to enforce the law); SEC v. General Host Corp., 60 F.R.D. 
640, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (same, citing risk of “diversion from main effort of [SEC] to 
enforce the laws”). 
115. See generally Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 505, 
510 (D. Colo. 1991), rev’d, 7 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir. 1993) (invoking claim preclusion to 
bar suit raising claims adjudicated in action brought by state and ending in consent de-
cree) (citing Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel 
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 692 n.32 (1979)). 
HILLMAN.TYP 9/29/2006  4:41 PM 
766 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 8:733 
Southern District of New York, the forum of the consent decree 
and the equivalent of ASCAP’s legal backyard. 
Even assuming that the passage of time and changed circum-
stances would allow for new litigation, few if any small business 
owners such as independent radio stations have the financial 
strength to fight ASCAP.  If they cannot afford to intervene in the 
underlying case, they cannot afford to undertake a new fight 
against ASCAP and its formidable counsel. 
D. A Pending and Proposed Solution 
Amidst all this doom and gloom has emerged very recently 
some hope that a legislative solution will be found for those market 
sectors who have not yet made their peace with the blanket license.  
In the absence of effective executive and judicial remedies these 
calls to action may be the only solution. 
1. The Fairness in Musical Licensing Act of 1997 
Prodded primarily by the National Restaurant Association 
(“NRA”), on January 21, 1997 Senators Strom Thurmond116 and 
Jesse Helms117 introduced Senate Bill 28 in the United States Sen-
ate, known popularly as The Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 
1997. 
This bill, which did not pass the 105th Congress, would have 
made great strides in resolving the problems addressed in this Es-
say. First, the bill would have eliminated the so-called “multiple 
performance” doctrine.  If a business, such as tavern or retail store, 
played a radio or television during business hours the “perform-
ance” would be exempted from fees under section 110(5) of the 
Copyright Act if no separate admission charge was collected and if 
the original broadcast earned fees for the performing rights socie-
ties.118 
 
116. Strom Thurmond, R. South Carolina. 
117. Jesse Helms, R. North Carolina. 
118. See S. 28, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1997), available in 
ftp.loc.gov/pub/thomas/c105/s2s.is.txt (visited February 20, 1998); see also, David M. 
Lilenfeld, Why Congress Should Eliminate the Multiple Performance Doctrine, 58 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 695 (1997). 
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Second, echoing the Girl Scout controversy, the bill would 
have exempted certain original performances in market sectors 
where ASCAP and BMI had, in the view of some, been overly ag-
gressive, such as county fairs and camping organizations.119 
Third, the bill would have addressed the inequities inherent in 
what was, in effect, a binding forum selection clause bound up in 
the ASCAP consent decree.  Instead of being forced to apply to the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
ASCAP’s domicile, for a fee determination, a procedure so costly 
it had been used only once in the first forty years of the ASCAP 
decree and then only by a major cable company, the bill would 
have allowed a non-broadcaster to initiate binding arbitration of a 
reasonable fee under the rules of the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation.120  Similarly, although a broadcaster could not initiate arbi-
tration, it could defend a local infringement suit by invoking court-
annexed arbitration proceedings by admitting the infringement but 
challenging the reasonableness of the fee.121 
A fourth provision, important to broadcasters like the hypo-
thetical WXYZ, was a provision establishing a rate-setting formula 
that would have made per-program licenses a viable alternative to 
the blanket license and allowed radio broadcaster to compel the is-
suance of per-program licenses in any district court.122  And lastly, 
the bill would have compelled the performing rights societies to 
make information about their repertory more complete and acces-
sible.123 
Not surprisingly, this sweeping set of proposed reforms was an 
anathema to the performing rights societies and they launched a 
vigorous counterattack.  Rather than the salvation for small busi-
nesses its sponsors claimed it would be, ASCAP asserted that the 
bill would destroy the livelihoods of thousands of “songwriters and 
composers who often have to work more than one job to earn a de-
 
119. See S. 28, 105th Cong. § 2(b), (d) (1997), available in 
ftp.loc.gov/pub/thomas/c105/s2s.is.txt (visited February 20, 1998). 
120. Id. § 3(d)(1). 
121. Id. § 3(d)(2). 
122. Id. § 4. 
123. Id. § 5(f). 
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cent living.”124  Its Internet website urged readers to join in a letter 
signed by the likes of Billy Joel, Marvin Hamlisch, and Marilyn 
Bergman, the Way We Were lyricist and ASCAP’s president, call-
ing the bill a “legislative taking of our property.”125 
2. The Sensenbrenner Amendment to The Copyright 
Term Extension Act of 1998 
While Senate Bill 28 was being debated, the owners of copy-
rights began to make progress on a long-simmering effort to pro-
long the term of United States copyrights.  Successful efforts to ex-
tend protection to “life plus 70” in Europe threatened to put 
American authors at a disadvantage.  When people also began to 
realize that certain American icons, like the original Mickey 
Mouse cartoons, might enter the public domain, the House of Rep-
resentatives moved quickly to address the problem.  To those who 
had been trying to reign in the performing rights societies, this pre-
sented an opportunity.  If copyright owners wanted an expansion 
of their statutory monopoly, they would have to agree to certain re-
strictions on the right of performance. 
On March 25, 1998, the House passed the Copyright Term Ex-
tension Act of 1998.126  Attached to the bill was an amendment of-
fered by Representative Sensenbrenner.127  The Sensenbrenner 
Amendment was patterned after Senate Bill 28, sponsored by 
Senators Helms and Thurmond.  The Sensenbrenner Amendment, 
however, omitted some provisions of Senate Bill 28 and softened 
others. 
Rather than exempt all multiple performances, the amendment 
limited the exemption to smaller venues.128  And even though the 
amendment included the important American Arbitration Associa-
tion and court-annexed arbitration provisions, it abandoned the ef-
forts to assist independent broadcasters by freeing them from the 
 
124. See ASCAP Internet Website, http://www.ascap.com/legislative/s28facts.html 
(visited July 25, 1998). 
125. Id. at http://www.ascap.com/legislative/s28letter.html (visited Feb. 20, 1998). 
126. H.R. 2589, 105th Cong. (1998). 
127. James Sensenbrenner, R-Wisconsin. 
128. See Summary of Sensenbrenner Amendment to H.R. 2589 at H1447, available 
in http://www.thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin (visited March 31, 1998). 
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rate-setting court and the blanket license.  Gone were the exemp-
tions for camps and fairs.  Although the Copyright Term Extension 
Act easily passed the House with the Sensenbrenner Amendment, 
it remains to be seen if it passes muster in the Senate. 
3. A “Performance Royalty Tribunal” 
The Sensenbrenner Amendment is an important first step.  Im-
portantly, it recognizes what has been well known for years.  
Namely, that the rate-setting court provisions of the 1950 consent 
decree did more to inflate the fees for blanket licenses than it did to 
lower them.  And if the mandatory arbitration provisions work well 
for non-broadcasters, and have the effect of lowering blanket fees 
for smaller market sectors such as fairs and camps, it could bode 
well for the continuing efforts to ease the arbitrary fees imposed on 
small market broadcasters. 
But the Sensenbrenner Amendment begs an unanswered ques-
tion.  If non-broadcasters in small market sectors need protection 
for the performing rights societies, the question is whether those 
protections are not also needed in broadcast media.  And while 
multi-district arbitration will certainly democratize rate setting, it 
might also fragment the decisions and raise the risk of inconsistent 
rulings and disparate treatment based on the vagaries of geo-
graphic, politics, and whim. 
The best approach would be to require statutorily the creation 
of a national rate-setting body—a “Performance Royalty Tribu-
nal”—funded by ASCAP through license fees.  Both sellers and 
users of the performance right, and the government, have recog-
nized the need for some non-market mechanism to set license 
fees.129  If such a body fairly represented the interests of both buy-
 
129. The solicitor general of the United States, Erwin N. Griswold, wrote in the 
context of the right of public performance, “If this market is to function at all, there must 
be . . . some kind of central licensing agency by which copyright holders may offer their 
works in a common pool to all who wish to use them.”  CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 
137 (2d Cir. 1977), rev’d, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). Unless the issue becomes mooted by tech-
nology, a possibility that becomes more and more feasible each day, all broadcast users 
of copyrighted music will pay more than the price a free market would set if the rate-
setting court created by the consent decrees remains as the machinery to insure fairness. 
Technology will play a significant role in shaping the future licensing and rate-
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ers and sellers and did not burden taxpayers, it could retain the ef-
ficiencies of the performing rights societies without suffering from 
the arbitrariness of the current market structure. 
CONCLUSION 
There seems little doubt that when the ASCAP and BMI cases 
were resolved by decree in 1950 and 1960, respectively, the gov-
ernment believed that the terms of the decree would help to elimi-
nate, or at least alleviate the harshness of, the anti-competitive be-
havior of the performing rights societies.  In hindsight, and it is 
admittedly a long look back, the consent decrees have been a fail-
ure. 
Rather than alleviate anti-competitive behavior, the consent de-
cress have imposed a market structure—and in the case of the 
ASCAP decree, a dispute resolution mechanism—that has perpetu-
ated, insulated, and even encouraged anti-competitive behavior.  
Yet there remains a need for some form of horizontal agreement.  
The system is skewed in favor of the performing rights societies 
and will remain so unless a forum is created where the powerful 
owners of copyright are made to stand on equal footing with less 
wealthy copyright users. 
In the end, the story of these consent decrees is a cautionary 
tale in a land increasingly ruled by intellectual property rights.  In 
those places where market failure or dominance, weak antitrust en-
forcement, and intellectual property rights converge, consumers 
and small business owners may find themselves without adequate 
remedies to battle monopolistic conduct.  The increased costs will 
have a profound effect on every market sector that relies on such 
products or services.  Given its increasing ubiquitousness, the ever-
expanding computer industry is one market where this fear may 
soon be realized.  Weak enforcement efforts crippled by concerns 
 
setting mechanisms.  SESAC already has announced new tracking technology that will 
allow it to monitor whenever a SESAC song is transmitted or broadcast digitally.  See 
SESAC Internet Website, http://www.sesac.com (visited July 25, 1998) (describing “Mu-
siCode”).  If such technology proves to be reliable, cheap, and effective in all media, it 
will make “per-use” licensing not only feasible but desirable.  Because it would be easy 
to determine which songs were actually used, the premise of the blanket license would be 
eliminated and users would be compelled to pay only for actual use on a per-song basis. 
HILLMAN.TYP 9/29/2006  4:41 PM 
1998] THE AGING ASCAP & BMI CONSENT DECREES 771 
over the globalization of trade and stifling innovation, when cou-
pled with the long statutory term of copyright protection, may raise 
the specter of pronounced and prolonged market concentrations, 
and monopolistic pricing, in the software industry.  The impact on 
market prices would likely be significant.  The harm will extend 
beyond the inevitable widening of the gulf between rich and poor 
such concentrations will inevitably produce. 
More importantly, we, as a society, cannot afford the cost of 
unfair pricing if the effect is to reserve to only the rich and middle-
class the benefits of digital advancements protected by copyright.  
We can only hope that any consent decrees entered to resolve these 
disputes, as they arise now and in the future, will recognize the 
synergistic effect of copyright and antitrust law and will not, as the 
ASCAP and BMI decrees do, perpetuate the evils of unchecked 
monopoly. 
